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This paper develops an equilibrium model of vertical foreclosure with the choice of
input specifications. In this model, vertical foreclosure occurs as the upstream division of
the integrated firm makes a specialized input for its sister downstream division while it
would, as an independent firm, provide a generalized input. The changes in incentives
with vertical integration can be explained by the externalities the choice of a specialized
input entails; vertical integration allows the upstream firm to internalize the benefit of
raising the rival firm's costs at the downstream level. The choice of a specialized input by
the integrated firm serves as a natural commitment mechanism not to supply the rival
downstream firms, and thus enables us to dispense with the controversial price
commitment assumption in the literature. We derive conditions for equilibrium vertical
foreclosure to occur and discuss its welfare consequences.
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L Introduction
Anti-competitive effects of vertical mergers continue to be a source of
disagreement among economists and antitrust practitioners. This lack of consensus,
reflected by large pendulous swings over time in the antitrust enforcement activities
regarding vertical mergers, is mainly due to the fact that the intellectual foundation of the
classical foreclosure theory was laid on shaky ground. Legal commentators, in particular,
from the Chicago school revealed the logical flaws and ill-conceivedness of the theory and
subsequently argued that vertical integration was most likely to be pro-competitive or
competitively neutral (Bork, 1978). Their criticisms had a major influence on antitrust
activities and was largely responsible in the 1970's and 1980's for the dormancy of
antitrust enforcement with vertical elements (Riordan, 1995).1
The Chicago school criticism, however, has also spawned a new research program
that attempts to place vertical foreclosure theory on a firmer theoretical ground with
game-theoretic foundations (see Ordover, Salop, and Saloner [1990]; Hart and Tirole
[1990]; Bolton and Whinston [1993]; and Salinger [1988]). Ordover, Salop, and Saloner
(henceforth, O-S-S), for instance, construct an equilibrium model of vertical foreclosure
that purportedly answers all the major elements of the Chicago school criticism, such as
the possibility of a counter-merger by the foreclosed firm and the hold-out incentives that
the target upstream firm may have in the acquisition process. As pointed out by Reiffen
(1992) and many others, however, O-S-S's model is deficient in making the assumption
that the vertically integrated firm is able to make a price commitment to the nonintegrated
downstream firm.2 This assumption essentially transforms the vertically integrated firm
into a Stackelberg leader and changes the nature of the input pricing game (see Reiffen's
1
 The pace of government enforcement activities, however, picked up recently especially in
telecommunications industry (Klass and Salinger, 1995)
2
 Reiffen and Vita (1995) state that "the Ordover et al. analysis leaves unanswered the question that
dogged earlier efforts to provide an economic rationale for a relationship between integration and
foreclosure...Ordover et al.'s ability to obtain a post-merger price increases is an artifact of an
inconsistency in their model."
[1992] comment and Ordover, Salop, and Saloner's [1992] reply for details).
In this paper, we develop a model of vertical foreclosure which dispenses with the
controversial assumption of price commitment in the O-S-S model; the integrated firm is
allowed to undercut the rival upstream firm whenever it is profitable. In other aspects, we
closely follows O-S-S in that the model fully accounts for the availability of a conter-
strategy by the foreclosed firm and the possibility of a hold-out problem by the target firm
in the vertical merger process.3
Consider a situation in which downstream firms produce differentiated products.
As a result of producing differentiated output, it is assumed that they demand
differentiated inputs from upstream firms. This may be due to the fact that they employ
different manufacturing processes or that differentiated outputs simply require a different
specification of inputs. Our formulation departs from O-S-S and the existing literature in
that the upstream firms make decisions with respect to the specification of the input
demanded by the downstream firms. In particular, we assume that the upstream firms can
choose (only) one of the following with respect to input specifications: a generalized input
that can be used by both downstream firms or a specialized input that is dedicated to one
of the two downstream firms. We further assume that the input specialized for one of the
downstream firms is less useful to the other downstream firm. Therefore, an upstream
firm's decision to supply one of the specialized inputs can serve as a commitment
mechanism to foreclose (downstream) firms other than the one the input is specifically
designed for. By introducing differentiated inputs, our formulation thus provides a natural
setting where the issue of vertical foreclosure can be addressed.
With this framework, we demonstrate that under the non-integrated vertical
3
 The reason for considering these possibilities is to meet the objections of the "Chicago School" who
argue that vertical foreclosure is implausible as an equilibrium phenomenon when these possibilities are
explicitly taken into account See the discussion in O-S-S (1990) for more details. Aghkm and Bolton
(1987), Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991), and McAfee and Schwartz (1994) also emphasize the
need to consider a fully specified equilibrium model for a meaningful analysis of the rationality and the
welfare implications of exclusionary strategies.
structure, both upstream firms tend to choose the generalized input and compete for the
businesses of both downstream firms. However, (partial) vertical integration changes the
integrated upstream firm's incentives concerning input specification; the integrated
upstream firm switches its input specification from the generalized input to the specialized
input for the downstream firm that belongs to the same integrated structure. The main
intuition for this result can be explained by considering the external effects associated with
the choice of a specific input. When one upstream firm, say Ul, chooses a specialized
input for one of the downstream firms, Dl, Ul raises the cost of the other downstream
firm D2 because of its withdrawal as D2's potential supplier. As a result, Dl benefits
from Ul's decision to tailor its input supply for Dl. This beneficial effect is not accounted
for when Ul makes its input specification decision as an independent firm. Since the
choice of a specialized input entails giving up the chance to supply the rest of the market,
no upstream firm is willing to supply specialized inputs when they operate as an
independent firm. After integration, however, if the beneficial effect of raising the rival
firm's costs is sufficiently large, then the integrated firm may decide to supply the
specialized input even if it must forego the chance to profitably supply the other
downstream firm.
Why then will the nonintegrated downstream firm whose costs have been raised,
not react with a counter-merger of its own to mitigate the adverse effect of its rival's
initial merger? The crucial link in our model is provided by the stochastic nature of cost
realizations. We assume that input costs are more positively correlated when the same
type of input is produced. For a variety of oligopoly models, competition is more intense
when firms are more symmetrically positioned in terms of costs. Therefore, firms are
collectively better off when their cost structure is asymmetric across firms (see Tirole,
1988, p. 223). This implies that the reduction of cost correlation via the choice of a
specialized input is similar to the provision of a public good; the cost of choosing a
specialized input is the foregone chance to serve the other half of the market, and it is
borne out by the individual firm while the benefit of reduced cost correlation accrues to
both upstream firms. Thus, from the collective viewpoint of the upstream firms, their
costs tend to be too correlated in the market outcome due to the undersupply of the public
good, that is, they choose the same specification of input (the generalized input) too
often.4 Partial vertical integration enhances the private benefit of providing the public
good (i.e., choosing a specialized input) by internalizing the beneficial effect of raising the
rival firm's costs at the downstream level. This effect induces the integrated firm to
undertake the provision of the public good itself and to overcome the public good
problem. It will, however, be shown that under wide circumstances, a counter-merger
changes the incentive of the initially integrated firm to revert back to the choice of the
generalized input. The reason is that the rival downstream firm will now be supplied at the
marginal cost of input production with the merger of its own and the effect of raising the
rival firm's costs, which was responsible for the choice of a specialized input by the
integrated firm under partial integration, no longer exists. As a result, a counter-merger
can strip the initially merged firm of the incentive to provide the public good (reduced cost
correlation) and can intensify competition. This threat prevents counter-mergers from
being materialized.
Our paper closely relates to McLaren (1996) who considers the incentive for
vertical integration that arises from the possibility of post-contractual opportunistic
behavior with specialized assets (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978). As in our paper,
his model allows for the endogenous choice of the degree of asset specificity by input
providers. Vertical integration in his model creates a negative externality for outsiders by
"thinning" the market for inputs and, thus, worsening opportunism problems. As he
concedes in his own paper, however, he is not concerned with the "foreclosure" motive of
4
 This result is reminiscent of Dasgupta and Maskin (1987) who show that the market portfolio of RAD
projects is characterized by excessive correlation due to a similar reason. As a firm moves away from its
rival in the space of research projects, it bestows a positive externality on the rival firm in that the
likelihood that the rival is successful when the firm in question is not, increases. This externality is not
take into account in the private firms' RAD portfolio decisions.
vertical integration, which is the main concern of our paper. Rather, his focus is on how
international trade affects the vertical structure of an industry by "thickening" the market.
McLaren shows that greater international openness brings convergence in the degree of
outsourcing across countries and promotes a less integrated vertical structure. In
addition, vertical integration in McLaren's model possesses the property of "strategic
complementarity** which can lead to multiple equilibria in the integration decisions.
Therefore, the vertical integration of one pair of upstream and downstream firms sets off a
chain reaction involving the other firms. In contrast, we are interested in the case where a
counter-merger is unprofitable and the effects of a foreclosure persist.
Our model also relates to Church and Gandal (1995), who consider the possibility
of foreclosure in systems markets where a final good consists of a hardware good and
complementary software. They consider two options for software firms in their format
decisions: Software firms can elect to either to make the software available only in a
format compatible with one particular hardware system or in formats compatible with both
systems. In their model, foreclosure takes place when the integrated firm refuses to supply
compatible software for a rival system because the value of a system depends on the
availability of software compatible with the system. Thus, the two options for software
firms in Church and Gandal (1995) correspond to the choice of a specialized input and a
generalized input in our model, respectively.5 In this respect, the model of Church and
Gandal can be considered as a special case of ours if the format decision in their model is
assumed to be an irreversible decision.6 In Church and Gandal, however, there are no
5
 Church and Gandal (1995) also follow the lead of O-S-S in that they consider a fully specified multi-
stage game where the possibilities of a counter strategy and a hold-out problem are accounted for.
6
 Church and Gandal (1995) assume a timing structure in which consumers purchase hardware first, then
software to avoid the possibility that software vendors affect the market share of a hardware technology by
their pricing decisions. As a result, only the number of software varieties compatible with each hardware
system will determine the market share. They argue that their results are robust to changes in the timing
of the compatibility decision in that the same results are derived if an integrated firm simultaneously
chose its hardware price and its software format However, if the integrated firm is given a chance to
introduce its software in a format compatible with the rival firm's system after consumers purchase
hardware, it will have an ex post incentive to do so. Therefore, their model suffers from the same type of
offsetting efficiencies associated with vertical merger and foreclosure because the
relationship between the hardware and software firms are not purely vertical in their
model. In addition, their timing assumption on the order of consumers' purchases
(hardware first and then software) deprives the integrated firm of the possibility to
eliminate any markup in the software market. In contrast, our model allows for the
possibility of successive markups when firms are not vertically integrated, one of the
central issues in the vertical integration literature (Spengler, 1950). Thus, we are able to
assess the conditions under which the harmful effects from vertical mergers outweigh the
beneficial ones (Klass and Salinger, 1995).7
It is interesting to note that our model seemingly generates the same type of post-
integration behavior as in Porter and Spence (1977). They develop a model of vertical
integration in which a downstream firm is prompted to integrate backwards due to its
inability to obtain on the market inputs with a desired set of attributes. One implication of
their model, therefore, is that the vertically integrated upstream firm will produce inputs
with specifications tailored for its sister downstream firm, inputs that were not offered
before on the market. Despite this similarity in the post-integration behavior, the
motivations behind vertical integration are quite different across models. In Porter and
Spence, the procurement of a specialized input tailored for its downstream division is the
end itself. If any harmful effect on welfare stems from vertical integration, it is an
unintended side effect. In our model, the choice of a specialized input is used as a means
of foreclosure for the purpose of raising the rival firm's costs (Salop and Scheffinan,
1983) and therefore, its purpose is more vicious than Porter and Spence (1977).
Finally, in a model of vertical integration with supply assurance motives, Carlton
commitment problem unless the compatibility decision is an irreversible decision that is made before or
with the hardware pricing decision.
7
 OS-S (1990) and Hart and Tirole (1990) also abstract from the issue of doubel marginalization in their
analyses. O-S-S assumes Bertrand competition upstream with a homogeneous input and identical
marginal costs under the unitegrated vertical structure. Hart and Tirole allows for perfect two-part tariffs
to eliminate successive markups.
(1979) assumes that an integrated firm cannot sell its inputs on the open market but does
not explain why. Our model, in a sense, supplies a theoretical foundation for Carlton's
assumption.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. Section II develops
an equilibrium model of vertical foreclosure with the choice of input specifications. We
derive conditions for vertical foreclosure to occur and discuss its welfare consequences.
In section in, we analyze an example of a Hotelling-type spatial competition. The
consideration of an explicit example allows us to completely characterize the region where
welfare-reducing vertical foreclosure occurs. Concluding remarks follow.
IL The Model
A. Set-up
We consider two downstream firms, Dl and D2, which compete in the final goods
market. Two upstream firms, Ul and U2, supply inputs to the two downstream firms.
Upstream firms engage in price competition for the business of downstream firms.
Downstream firms transform one unit of the intermediate good into one unit of the final
good, and are assumed to incur no costs other than the input prices they pay to the
upstream suppliers. At this stage, we do not make any assumptions about the nature of
competition in the final goods market - Dl and D2 could play either a pricing or an output
game. Instead, we will just write the equilibrium outputs and profits for each downstream
firm as reduced-form functions of the vector of constant marginal costs (input prices they
pay to the upstream firms). We assume that demand functions are symmetric and
therefore, profit functions are also symmetric across the two downstream firms. This
symmetry assumption enables us to write the equilibrium output and profit for a
representative downstream firm simply as q(x, y) and rc(x, y), where the first component of
the arguments (x) refers to its own marginal cost and the second component (y) refers to
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Assumption 1 says that a firm's output expands and profit increases as the rival firm's cost
increases whereas its output contracts and profit decreases as its own cost increases. This
assumption is standard and is satisfied by virtually all oligopoly models with suitable
stability conditions.
We depart from O-S-S by allowing the upstream firms to make decisions
concerning the specification of the input demanded by the downstream firms. More
precisely, we assume that the upstream firms have three alternatives: providing either a
generalized input that can be used by both downstream firms (denoted by G) or a
specialized input that is dedicated to one of the two downstream firms (Si or S2). For
simplicity, we assume that a specialized input Si is specifically designed for Dl 's particular
manufacturing process to the extent that it cannot be used economically for the other
downstream firm D2, and vice versa. Choosing a specialized input for one particular
downstream firm is, therefore, effectively a commitment not to supply the other
downstream firm. For instance, a software developer may write a program to fit the
peculiarities of a single firm's business, or may design it for the mass market as packaged
software (McLaren, 1996).8 Another example of specification choice involves IBM in the
1970's which redesigned its mainframe computer interfaces to make it difficult for non-
IBM hard drives to be used with them (Brock, 1989).
As it will be made clear below, it is never optimal for both upstream firms to
choose the same type of specialized input. In conjunction with the symmetry assumption,
this allows us to assume, without loss of generality, that Ul chooses S, and U2 chooses S2
if they decide to supply specialized inputs. There are four possible cases of input
8
 Japanese software houses are known to fit the former category, developing proprietary systems for
particular customers (Baba, Takai, and Mizuta, 1995).
specifications to consider: (G, G), (Si, S2), (G, S2) and (Si,G), where the first and second
components in parentheses denote the choices of input specifications by Ul and U2,
respectively. If (G, G) is the choice made by Ul and U2, both upstream firms are capable
of supplying both downstream firms. However, if (Si, S2) is chosen, the input market for
the two downstream firms is effectively segmented since Ul can supply only to Dl and
similarly for U2 and D2. As a result, both upstream firms are monopolists in their own
segmented markets (only constrained by the competitive fringe as explained below). If (G,
S2) is chosen, Dl can be served only by Ul (and the competitive fringe) because U2 has
dedicated its production process to supply for D2 only. However, there is competition
between Ul and U2 to supply to D2 because D2 can use inputs from either upstream firm,
the generalized input from Ul or the specialized input from U2. It is worthwhile to note
that one consequence of Ui's decision to supply input Si is to limit competition in Dj's
input market and thus raise Dj's costs, where i=l, 2 and i*j.
After the choice of input specificity, the production costs of inputs are realized
randomly. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the cost of production takes only two
values, c and c, where c < c . The cost uncertainty implies that double marginalization
can arise when the firms are not vertically integrated (Spengler, 1950), and thus allows us
to assess the conditions under which the harmful effects from vertical mergers outweigh
the beneficial ones (Klass and Salinger, 1995). Let the unconditional probability of each
cost realization be equal regardless of the choice of input specification, i.e., Pr(c) = Pr(c )
= 1/2.9
We allow the possibility of cost correlation across firms. More specifically, we
assume that the costs ait positively correlated if both firms choose the same input
specification. Cost correlation, however, can be reduced if the two upstream firms
produce inputs of different specifications. In other words, they are more likely to be
' We can easily generalize the distributional assumptions without affecting the main qualitative results.
subjected to the same type of common cost shocks if they produce the same input.10 For
simplicity, we assume that cost realization is independently distributed across firms when
inputs are of different specifications.11 The only relevant case of correlated production
cost, therefore, is when both upstream firms decide to supply the generalized input (G)
because producing the same type of specialized input is never optimal for upstream firms.
There are four possible outcomes of cost realizations: ( c, c ) (c
 tc)f(c,c), and
fe_£). Let p be the correlation coefficient between the costs of two upstream firms when
both choose G, where 0< p <1. Then, we have
(1) Pr[(c ,c )|(G, G)] = Pr[fo _c)\ (G, G)] =
Pr[(c, c)\ (G, G)] = Pr[fe c)\ (G, G)] =
In all other choices of input specifications, we have
(2) Pr[(c ,c )| (A, B)] = Pr[fe _c)| (A, B)] = Pr[(c, c)\ (A, B)] = Pr[fe c)\ (A, B)]= 1/4,
where (A, B) = (G, S2), (S,, G), or (S,, S2).
One natural interpretation of the model is that we take the event of a low cost
realization as an innovation. Upstream firms have discretion over what kind of
innovations to pursue. Choosing a generalized input specification can be considered as
devoting their innovation resources to an innovation that can be used by both downstream
firms. Choosing a specialized input specification amounts to concentrating on the
improvement of inputs that is more important to one of the two downstream firms.l2 For
instance, software developers have discretion over which platform to support (Church and
10
 The randomness of the cost realizations can also be due to the uncertainty in innovation. In this case, it
is well known that similar scientific advances are often made more than one research teams working
independetly of one another, that is, the probabilitiy of discoveries are highly correlated across research
teams when they are engaged in similar projects. Merton (1961) calls this type of phenomenon
"multiples."
1
' More generally, we could assume that production of inputs with different specifications entails less
correlated cost structure without qualitatively affecting the main results.
12
 See Baldwin (1983) and Choi and Yi (19%) for an explicit analysis of R&D incentives in the context
of vertical merger.
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GandaJ, 1995).13 They can spend resources to an area that can be portable to either
platform or exclusively focus on one platform. In this regard, it is interesting to note that
Microsoft has been alleged to be neglectful of the development of application software for
the Macintosh operating system (Gleick, 1995).14
We further assume that there is a competitive fringe that supplies the generalized
input at the cost of c . As it will be clear later, this assumption is not crucial for our
analysis and is made for expository convenience. The existence of fringe firms can serve as
a lid on the price of inputs regardless of the upstream firms' input specificity choices and
cost realizations. If we interpret the low cost realization as an innovation, we can think of
an initial situation where many firms are willing to supply at the cost of c, which can
serve as a competitive fringe. Among them, only two firms, Ul and U2, are capable of
making cost-reducing innovations.
Recall that q(x, y) denotes the equilibrium output for a downstream firm when it
pays the input price of x and the rival firm pays y. Since one unit of input is needed to
produce one unit of final product, we can use q(x, y) to obtain the derived demand for
upstream firms. For instance, suppose that both upstream firms supply the generalized
input. In this case, if Ui and Uj sell the input at the price of x and y, respectively, i*j, and
x <max(y, c ), then, Ui's demand function can be written as 2q(x, x) while Uj's demand is
zero. Ui's profit is given by (x-c)2q(x, x) if its production cost is c. In contrast, if Ui
supplies a specialized input for Di, then, its demand function when it charges x can be
written as q(x, y), when Ui is the lowest price supplier for Di and Dj pays an input price
of y. Ui's profit in this case is (x-c)q(x, y) when its production cost is c. These profit
functions for upstream firms are assumed to be well-behaved concave functions. To
13
 In this respect, a decision to support only one hardware format is similar to tying in its exclusionary
effect in that other hardware vendors of competing formats are foreclosed. For an analysis of tying as an
exclusionary device see Whinston (1990) and Choi (19%). Church and Gandal (1995) also discuss the
relationship between compatibility and tying decisions in their foreclosure effects.
14
 In other contexts, it may be more appropriate that the probability of low cost realization is higher for a
specialized input Allowing this possibility does not change the qualitative results of the paper and only
makes the main effects of vertical integration less transparent.
11
abstract from the tedious process of deriving the monopolistic input supplier's optimal




> 0 for any ye [c, c ]
x=c
Assumption 2 ensures that the competitive pressure of fringe firms is always binding. In
other words, the monopolistic supplier of inputs will always have incentive to set a higher
price than c in the absence of fringe firms. This implies that when there is only one firm
with the cost of c, it will set the price of the input at c (minus e) . This condition is
satisfied if the difference between c and c is not too large. If we interpret the low cost
realization event as an innovation, Assumption 2 is also referred to as a nondrastic
innovation in the R&D literature.
Assumption 3.
7Cfe C) + 71(C,C)>7C(C,C) + Tt(c, c)
Assumption 3 states that the aggregate industry profit is higher when the downstream
firms have asymmetric cost structures with their mean costs constant. This assumption is
satisfied in a variety of oligopoly models since competition tends to be more intense, and
as a result, more industry rent is dissipated when firms are more symmetrically positioned
in terms of costs (Tirole, 1988, p. 223).
To analyze potential anti-competitive effects of vertical foreclosure, we consider
the following five stage game. The game structure closely follows O-S-S to facilitate
comparison.15 In the first stage, the downstream firms bid to acquire one of the upstream
suppliers. As in O-S-S, if there is a merger, we assume that it occurs between Ul and Dl.
In the second stage, we allow the possibility of a counter-merger between U2 and D2,
provided there is a merger between Ul and Dl. In the third stage, each upstream firm
decides on the type of inputs (G or Si) that will be supplied. The choice of input
15
 See also Hart and Tirole (1990) for detailed comments on the timing of the game.
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specifications is considered irreversible at later stages. Our main emphasis is on how the
vertical structure of the industry affects the choice of input specifications. In the fourth
stage, input costs are realized depending on the choices of input specifications made by the
upstream firms. Note that the distribution of cost realizations depends on the choice of
input specifications. In particular, we assume that producing the same type of input
causes their production costs to be positively correlated. Given cost realizations and the
industry structure, input prices for the downstream firms are determined. In the final
stage, downstream prices are chosen, given input prices. To derive the subgame perfect
equilibrium of the game, we proceed by backward induction.
B. Input Specificity under Various Vertical Structures
In this subsection, we analyze the equilibrium choice of input specifications under
two alternative vertical structures - nonintegration (NI) and partial (vertical) integration
(PI). We are most interested in how vertical integration by Ul and Dl changes the
equilibrium choices of input specification. The case of input choices under full integration
(FI) will be considered when we analyze U2 and D2's incentive to countermerge in the
face of the Ul-Dl merger.
1. Nonintegration (NI)
We first analyze the incentives for upstream firms with respect to input
specification when both upstream firms are independent and vertically separated from
downstream firms. To analyze these incentives, we need to derive the expected profits for
the upstream firms under different configurations of input choices. As noted earlier, there
are four possible configurations to consider: (G, G), (Si, S2), (S,,G) and (G, S2).
Case I. (G, G): In this case, the probability of each cost realization is given by Eq. (1).
Under this regime, both upstream firms can supply both downstream firms. Bertrand
13
competition between upstream firms imply that an upstream firm i can have profits only
when it is a low cost producer in comparison to the other firm j who is a high cost
producer, i.e., Ci=_c and c,—c , b*j. In this case, due to Assumption 2, firm i supplies to
both downstream firms at the price of mi = c, and earns the profit of 2# , where ^ =
( c -c)q (c,c). The probability of this event is given by (1 -p)/4. In other events, the firm
earns zero profit due to competition. Therefore, the expected profit for each upstream
firm under (G,G) is given by:
(3) $ ^
For future reference, we also derive the expected profit for downstream firms. Under (G,
G), the input prices will be c for all cost realizations except (c ,_c), in which case input
prices are driven to c due to Bertrand competition. Therefore, the expected profit for
each downstream firm is given by
(4) nS(G,G)=i^«(c,c) + ( l - ^ ) j t ( c , c)
4 4
Case n. (Si, S2): Under this regime, the two upstream firms do not compete with each
other because each upstream firm can supply its inputs only to the downstream firm to
which its input is dedicated. In this case, the profit for each upstream firm is independent
of the cost realization of the rival firm. The only competition comes from the fringe who
supplies the generalized input at c . Each upstream firm earns profits only when it is a
low cost producer. Note that under this regime, each upstream firm can earn positive
profits even if the other upstream firm's cost is also low. Therefore, each firm's expected
profit under this regime is given by:
(5) E^(S1 ,S2) = ( c - c ) q ( c , c y 2 = ^ / 2
When both upstream firms provide specialized inputs, both of them are monopolistic
suppliers. As a result, the input prices for both downstream firms are given by c,
regardless of the cost realizations for upstream firms.
(6) nS(S!,S2) = 7c(c ,c)
14
Case III. Mixed input specifications (S,,G): This case considers the situation when Ul
chooses the specialized input for Dl whereas U2 produces the generalized input. In this
case, both Ul and U2 compete for the business of Dl. However, D2 can be served only
by U2. Therefore, U2 has monopoly power over D2, which implies that D2's marginal
cost is always c . In particular, even when both upstream firms have the low cost, D2 is
supplied at the price of c while Dl's input cost is driven down to c due to competition.
We have
(7) n^(S1 ,G) = ( c ^ ) q ( c , c V 4 = ^ / 4
(8) It?2 (S,, G) = [(c-c) q (c , c)/4] + [2(c -c) q(c ,c
= ^ + (2^
4 ~ 4
Note that <f> = (c-c) q(c, c) < (c-c) q(c ,c ) =^, due to Assumption 1. The first term of
U2's profit comes when both upstream firms have the low production cost, whereas the
second term is its profit when it is the only one which has the low production cost.
Under (St,G), the downstream firms' profits are given by
(9) 5 iG ) 7 * f c ) (
4 4
( 1 0 ) £ ^ iS , , G ) ^ * ( , ) ( ) 7 c ( , )4 4
Note that Dl is better off while D2 is worse off when one of the upstream firms
tailor its input specification for Dl. This externality will form the basis of the analysis that
follows.
Case IV. Mixed input specifications (G, S2): This is the mirror image of Case III.
By comparing the upstream firms' expected payoffs under various input
specifications, we can derive the following proposition.
15
Proposition 1. When both upstream firms are nonintegrated, the equilibrium in the
choices of input specification can be characterized in the following way:
(i) if p <l/2, (G, G) is the unique Nash equilibrium,
(ii) if p >l/2, there exist multiple equilibria. There are two asymmetric pure
strategy equilibria, which are (S,,G) and (G, S2). In addition, there is a symmetric mixed
strategy equilibria in which Ui chooses Si with probability of n = 1
The intuition for Proposition 1 is simple. When upstream firms compete with each
other in Bertrand competition, Ui can get positive profits only when it has the low cost
realization while Uj has the high cost realization, i*j. The probability of this asymmetric
cost realization is reduced as the correlation parameter p increases. In this sense, p can be
considered as a parameter representing the intensity of competition. When p is low (p
<l/2), choosing G is a dominant strategy for both upstream firms. The reason for this is
that choosing a specialized input is too costly a choice because it entails giving up half of
the potential market. As p increases further than 1/2, however, competition becomes too
intense. This creates an incentive for one of the upstream firms to choose a different input
specification to relax competition by reducing cost correlation. As a result, (G, G) cannot
be sustained as a Nash equilibrium if p is too high (p >l/2).
Note that relaxing competition by reduced cost correlation requires that only one
firm switch to a specialized input. Since choosing a specific input involves the cost of
giving up the opportunity to serve the other half of the market, this implies that the choice
of specific input is analogous to the provision of a public good; while the benefit of
reduced correlation is shared by both upstream firms, the cost of it is solely borne by the
firm switching to a specialized input. This implies that from the collective viewpoint of
the upstream firms, their costs tend to be too correlated in the market outcome, that is,
they choose the same specification of input (the generalized input) too often (Dasgupta
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and Maskin, 1987).16 This also explains why the input specification game has the payoff
matrix of a chicken game when p >l/2, with two asymmetric pure strategy equilibria and
one symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium.
In the rest of the paper, we focus mainly on the case where p e[0, 1/2] for two
reasons. First, it enables us to avoid the issue of multiple equilibria. Second, and more
importantly, the issue of vertical integration-induced foreclosure does not arise when p
>l/2 because vertical foreclosure is already present, even with independent suppliers.
Thus, we explore how vertical integration can change the incentives to supply a
specialized input when both upstream firms supply the generalized input and compete with
each other under NI.
At this stage, it is enlightening to consider the effect of the Ul's choice of Si on
other firms. U2 benefits from Ul's choice of specific input through two channels. First, it
exercises monopoly power over D2 due to Ul's commitment to supply only to Dl.
Second, cost correlation is reduced across the two upstream firms. As pointed out earlier,
D2 loses because its input price is raised due to Ul's withdrawal as a potential supplier of
its input. Most importantly, Dl gains because its rival firm's cost is raised (Salop and
Scheffman, 1983). The recognition of these externalities will be crucial to understand the
incentives to choose a specialized input when one of the upstream firms is vertically
integrated; vertical integration provides a mechanism to internalize the positive externality
(the benefit from raising the rivals' costs) on Dl of choosing S,.
2. Partial Integration (PD
Let us assume that the industry has a partially integrated structure, i.e., Ul and Dl
have vertically integrated whereas U2 and D2 remain independent. We assume that
vertical integration does not entail any changes in the underlying production technology.17
16
 It can be easily verified that the joint profits of upstream firms increase when one of the firms choose a
specialized input if p> - (1-1).
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Within the vertically integrated firm (Ul-Dl), Ul supplies its output at the internal
transfer price equal to its marginal cost of production. After integration, the decision on
input specification will be made based on its impact on combined profits of Ul-Dl. We
can write the profit for the integrated firm under various configurations of input
specification in the following way.
Suppose that both integrated firm and nonintegrated upstream firm U2 have
chosen to produce the generalized input that can be used by both downstream firms. In
this case, if the cost realization is (c, c), both downstream firms will have marginal costs of
c, and the integrated firm has the profit of TC(C, c). The probability of this event is (l+p)/4
because they produce the same type of input. If the cost realization is (c, c), which
occurs with probability of (l-p)/4, the integrated downstream firm produces at the cost of
c whereas the nonintegrated downstream firm D2's marginal cost is c . Therefore, the
integrated firm has the profit of n(c, c) in the final product market. In addition, the
integrated firm supplies to D2 at the price of c and earns^ = (c ~c) q(c, c) in the input
market. If the cost realization is ( c , c) or ( c , c ), both downstream firms' marginal costs
are c, and the integrated firm earns the profits of n( c, c ). Therefore, the integrated
firm's expected profit under (G, G) can be written as
(11) 4 4 - 2
Note that in writing (11), we, unlike O-S-S, do not assume the ability of the integrated
firm to make commitments not to supply to D2 or to a specific price. As a result, when
both upstream firms have the low cost, the input price to D2 will be driven to c due to
competition.
17
 In other words, we abstract from internal organization aspects of vertical integration that may induce
different production costs of inputs across integrated and nonintegrated upstream firms through various
incentive effects. A recent literature on the internal organization of the firm, for instance, emphasizes
how vertical integration affects the incentive to make a relationship-specific investment by eliminating the
possibility of post-contractual opportunistic behavior (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978) or through the
allocation of residual rights of control over assets (Grossman and Hart, 1986).
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Now suppose that the integrated firm, Ul-Dl, chooses Si whereas U2 chooses G.
Then, the integrated firm cannot sell to D2 even when it is the only low cost producer.
Due to the lack of competition, the input cost for D2 is always c . Since there is no profit
for Ul, the integrated firm's expected profit under (Si, G) is
(12) IlJU.CS,, G)= T^cfe cK \<cy c)
Proceeding in the same way, we can derive the expected profits for the integrated firm
under alternative input specifications.
(13) nSUi(G, S2)=77ifec)+ I[7r(c, C ) + * ] + - U ( C , C)
4 4 - 2
(14) nSU, (S,, S2) = ^Tcfe c )+ \%{c, c )
Similarly, the expected profit for the nonintegrated upstream firm U2 can be also written
as:
(15) S ' i ^ *
4 -
4 4 -
Now let us consider the incentives for the integrated firm, Ul-Dl, to deviate from
(G, G) configuration.
(16) 5 U £ '
^ [ C f e c ) 7 C ( c , c ) ] ^
4 4 -
The Ul-DTs incentive to switch to a specialized input under vertical integration consists
of two components. The first term represents the impact of choosing the specialized input
on raising rival firms' costs through its commitment to not supply to D2. The second term
is the negative effect of limiting Ul's customer base by not supplying to D2. Let p* be
the (unique) critical value which makes n^_Di (Si, G) =I~Iin_Di (G, G). Then, we have
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(17) p* = ~ L
£ + [/r(c,c)-
With modified incentives accompanying vertical integration, we can derive the following
proposition.
Proposition 2. Let us restrict our attention to the parameter region where (G, G) is the
unique equilibrium under nonintegration, i.e., p e[0, 1/2]. Then, we have the following
characterization of equilibrium choices of input specification under partial integration.
(i) if p> p *, (Si, G) is the unique equilibrium,
(ii) if p < p *, (G, G) is the unique equilibrium.
(iii) (Si, S2) and (G, S2) cannot be sustained as an equilibrium.
Proof. Simple comparisons of expected profits under various input specifications.
Let us define a set of correlation coefficients, £ = [p., 1/2], which may be called the
vertical foreclosure set, where p. = max ( p*, 0). Then, Proposition 2 informs us that
when p e Z , the upstream firm in the integrated structure changes its input specification
from the general input to the specific input (dedicated to its own downstream firm),
thereby withdrawing from the input market for the rival downstream firm. As a result, the
nonintegrated downstream firm (D2) loses trading opportunities with the integrated
upstream firm (Ul) and vertical foreclosure occurs. The reason for the incentive change
with vertical integration can be explained by the internalization of the benefit to Dl of
raising the rival firm's costs (Salop and Scheflman, 1983), which is given by
[n(CjC) - /r(c,c)]. When Ul and Dl remain as independent firms, this positive externality
is not accounted for when Ul decides on its input specification. As an integrated firm, this
benefit is taken into consideration in its input specification decision.
The non-emptiness of the set £ is crucial for the input specialization-induced
market foreclosure to occur with partial integration. The set also needs to be reasonably
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large for the type of market foreclosure considered in this paper to have practical
importance. Hence, it is worthwhile to explore the plausibility of such a set. The
examination of Eq. (17) reveals that the existence and the size of the set I depends on the
relative magnitudes of ^ and [n(c,c) - /r(c,c)]. In particular, p* decreases with
[n(c,c) - fl"(c,c)], which implies that the set I expand as [/rfoc) - n(c,c)] increases.
This confirms our intuition that the incentive to choose a specialized input with vertical
integration increases as the benefit of raising the rival firm's costs increases.
More specifically, for the standard models of oligopoly we can show the following
(see the Appendix). In both (i)Cournot competition with homogeneous products and
linear demand curve (P =a - Q) and (ii)Hotelling-type price competition with differentiated
products, p* cannot exceed 1/5, thereby ensuring that the set I is at least larger than [1/5,
1/2]. When we define A = c - c, we can also show that p* decreases as A increases in
both cases, signifying the fact the effect of raising rival firm's cost increases with A.18
With the Hotelling model, p* also decreases as t (transportation cost parameter)
decreases. Since t can be considered as a measure of competitiveness, this implies that
raising the rival firm's cost becomes more important as the degree of competitiveness at
the downstream level is intensified. Furthermore, we can show that (i) if A>a/7 with
Cournot competition, where a is the demand intercept and (ii)if A/t >3/4 with Hotelling
competition, we have p*< 0, which implies that market foreclosure occurs for the whole
parameter space we consider, i.e., Z = [0, 1/2].
For £ to be an empty set, it is required that p* >l/2, or ^ >3 [x(c,c) - /r(c,c)],
which is a quite stringent condition to satisfy. For instance, from our discussion above,
we know that this condition is never satisfied for a Cournot competition with linear
demand or for a Hotelling-type price competition. Therefore, we conclude that for almost
18
 Note that A measures the increase in the rival downstream firm' s input acquisition cost due to vertical
foreclosure.
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all conceivable oligopoly models of downstream competition, there exists a set (S) that
induces market foreclosure with partial integration.
C. Incentives for Anti-competitive Vertical Integration
In this subsection, we analyze the incentive to vertically integrate. If vertical
integration does not involve the changes in the types of inputs produced by the merged
firms, there is no vertical foreclosure on D2, and its only effect is the elimination of double
marginalization for the Ul-Dl pair. In most standard oligopoly models, this effect tends
to increase total output and reduce prices for consumers. As a result, social welfare
increases. To focus on potential anti-competitive effects of vertical integration, we
concentrate on the case where the equilibrium input specification is changed from (G, G)
to (Si,G) after vertical integration, that is, p e £ = [& 1/2].
Then, the condition that vertical integration is profitable is given by:
(is) G" = n57i-jD, (s,, G> - trif, (G, G> +nS(G, G>]
^ 7 c ( c , c)]7 C ( C , )
X)
By rearranging terms, the condition for profitable partial integration (PI) can be rewritten
as
(PI) 0 * ^ [ , t ( c > c ) r c ( c , ) ] ^ [ K ( c ) c ) ( K ( c , c ) ^ ) ] ^ X4 4 4
The effect of vertical integration on the combined profits of Ul and Dl comprises of three
elements. The first term on the RHS of (19) is the positive effect of raising the rival firm's
costs when both firms have a low cost realization. The second term is the effect of
eliminating double marginalization between Ul and Dl when Ul has a lower cost
realization and U2 has a higher cost realization. Before vertical integration, Dl is supplied
at the price of c by Ul. After vertical integration, Ul transfers input internally to Dl at
the marginal cost c. In contrast to the successive monopoly case analyzed by Spengler
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(1950), this effect, in general, is ambiguous in the oligopoly. It depends on the cost
differential between c and c and on whether the strategic variables are strategic
complements or substitutes. The third term is the negative effect of giving up part of the
market by producing a specialized input with vertical integration. Therefore, we can
conclude that if the beneficial effect of raising the rival firm's costs is sufficiently important
relative to the loss of upstream business, there can be an anti-competitive vertical merger.
If the nature of downstream competition is strategic substitutes, then the incentive for
vertical merger will be reinforced by the elimination of double marginalization. If the
strategic variable is strategic complements, the effect of the second term will weaken the
incentive to vertically merge if the difference between c and c is small, while it will
strengthen it if the difference is large [see Bonanno and Vickers, 1988].
As emphasized by the Chicago school and O-S-S, to have a complete theory of
anti-competitive mergers, we also need to analyze the incentive to countermerge by the
remaining independent firms, which can undo the initial anti-competitive effect of the
merger by Ul and Dl.
D. Incentive for Counter-merger
In this section, we analyze the incentive for D2 to countermerge with U2 in the
face of the vertical merger between Ul and Dl. There will be a counter-merger if U2 and
D2, as an integrated firm, can make more profits than the combined profits they can earn
as separate identities. We know that after Ul-Dl merger, the merged firm chooses Si
whereas U2 chooses G, if p 6 l = [g, 1/2]. Therefore, without a counter-merger, U2 and
D2's expected profits as separate entities can be written as:




To derive the equilibrium profits after counter-merger (CM), we have to first
analyze the equilibrium choice of input specification under full integration (FI). When
both firms are vertically integrated, U2-D2's expected profit under each input specification
configuration is as follows:
^ * t e ) ^ [ * f e ) * ] ^ K ( , )
4 4 - 4 4
K f e £ ) [ * ( , ) ^ ] j t ( , ) i j i ( c , c )
4 4 ~ 4 4
, S2) =n5, r a(S,, S2) =^ Jtfe c) + i n f e c ) + i JI(C , c) +iji(<F, c )
4 4 4 4
Under full integration (FI), therefore, (G, G) is once again the Nash equilibrium in input
specifications if the following condition is satisfied:
(20) n^m(GyG)-U^Dl(SuG)
= f {[Ttfe c) +n(c, c )] - [*fe c ) + TC(C , c)]} + !=-£ ^ > 0
4 4 -
Let us define p** be the unique critical value which makes Ilu,_D, (G, G) = ITy,^, (Si, G),
i.e.,
(21) p** = = = — = (>0)
I + [*(c,c) - ^(c,c)] - [/r(c,c) - x(c,c)]
By conducting an analysis similar to the cases of nonintegration and partial integration, we
can state the following.
Proposition 3. Under full integration, the equilibrium in the choices of input specification
can be characterized in the following way:
(i) if p < p**, (G, G) is the unique Nash equilibrium,
(ii) if p > p**, there exist multiple equilibria. There are two asymmetric pure
strategy equilibria, which are (S,,G) and (G, S2). In addition, there is a symmetric mixed
strategy equilibria in which Ui chooses Si with probability of
n= i = =—=-= = — .
W [^fec) - ^foc)]-[^-(c,c) - n{c,c)]}
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Note that p** = = = — =
I + [x(c,c) - n{c,cj\ - [x(c,c) - /r(c,c)]
>= = = p*.
l + [*(£»c)-*(£,£)]
Therefore, we can define a set [g, ~p ] as long as the set £ we defined earlier is non-empty,
where ~p = min(p**, 1/2). When p e[g,p] , the choice of input specification is such that
with partial integration the integrated firm chooses a specialized input and vertical
foreclosure occurs, while in all other cases of vertical structures both upstream firms
choose the generalized input.
Now suppose that p e[p_, ~p ]. Then, the relevant combined profit after counter-
merger is nJJ^ (G, G). The condition for the countermerger to not be profitable is given
by:
( 2 2 ) G c M = ^ £ ' £




By rearranging Eq. (22), we can write the no counter-merger condition (NCM) as
follows:
(G, £ Sf
- {[*fe C) - 7C(C , C)] + [7lfe C ) - 7C(C , C )]}
4
^ { [ f e ) « ( > e ) ] [ i f e e ) ( , ) ] } [ ( ^ ) ^ ]4 4 4~
A counter-merger by the foreclosed downstream firm can eliminate double
marginalization and thus, undo the foreclosure effect of the initial vertical merger between
Ul and Dl, which is represented by the first term above. Counter-merging, however, at
the same time can reintroduce cost correlation between the two downstream firms. In the
absence of the effect of raising the rival's costs, Ul-Dl ceases to have the incentive to
supply a specialized input. As a result, a counter-merger in a sense deprives Ul-Dl of the
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incentives to provide the public good (reduced cost correlation) and intensifies
competition, the negative effect of which is given by the second term. The third term is
the loss of the upstream firm's profits due to vertical integration. Hence, the no counter-
merger condition (NCM) indicates that if the threat of intensified competition,
parametrized by p, is sufficiently large and outweighs the benefit of preventing foreclosure
effect, counter-merger can be deterred.
E. Hold-out Problem?
In this section, we analyze the bidding process through which an upstream firm is
acquired by a downstream firm. To keep the analysis as close to O-S-S as possible, we
consider a bidding contest in which both downstream firms bid for a designated upstream
firm, Ul . In particular, we are interested in whether or not Ul has an incentive to hold-
out in the bidding process, hoping for higher profits as an independent firm when the other
upstream firm is acquired. Suppose that p e [g, ~p ] and conditions PI and NCM are
satisfied.
We know that the profit after the merger is given by T]$\-D\ (SI, G) = — rc(c, c) +
— n(c, c). If Dl loses in the bidding, it earns — n(c, c) + — n(c, c) because it will
be denied the access to U2's input supply (see Eq. (19)). Therefore, Dl is willing to bid
up to the difference between these two profit levels, i.e., b = — [rc(c, c ) - n(c, _c)]. Since
D2 has the same incentive to bid, competition will drive the acquisition price of Ul up to
b.
Now suppose that Ul refuses to be bought by the downstream firms. If U2 is
bought by one of the downstream firms instead, Ul , as an independent firm, will get the
profit of 1 ( 2 ? ) + ! ^ (seeEq. (19)).
4 4 -
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For Ul to not have the incentive to hold-out in the acquisition process, Ul should
get a higher payoff by selling at the price of b rather than remaining as an independent
firm. The following gives us the condition for which there will be no hold-out (NHO).
(NHO)b - n£(S,, G) = i[*(£, c)-*(c, .c)] - [1(2*) + 1 1 ] X)
Now we have the main proposition of the paper.
Proposition 4. Suppose that p e[g ,p] , and conditions (PI), (NCM), and (NHO) are
satisfied. Then, there is an equilibrium market foreclosure with vertical integration. The
integrated upstream firm switches to the specialized input dedicated to its own
downstream firm, thereby committing not to supply to the rival downstream firm.
F. Welfare Effects of Vertical Merger
The welfare consequences of a vertical merger is, in general, ambiguous due to
three compounding effects on social welfare. First, a vertical merger eliminates the double
marginalization problem for the merging firm. This effect is, in general, positive for social
welfare. However, the foreclosure effects of a vertical merger raise the costs of the
nonintegrated downstream firm and have a negative consequence on social welfare.
Finally, a vertical merger reduces the correlation of input costs of the downstream firms.
For a variety of oligopoly models, the increase in cost asymmetry due to a vertical merger
reduces competition and is harmful for social welfare even if it is privately optimal for the
firms (Tirole, 1988). In the next section, we consider explicit models of oligopoly which
allow us to completely characterize the conditions for an equilibrium vertical merger and
its welfare consequences.
UL Analysis of Explicit Examples
We demonstrate the plausibility of the anti-competitive effects of vertical
27
integration with examples of a Hotelling-type spatial competition and Cournot competition
in the final product market.
1. Hotelling Competition in the Final Product Market
Suppose that two downstream firms are located at the end points of the unit
interval. Consumers are uniformly distributed along the interval. They demand only one
unit of the good and have reservation values of v, which is assumed to be sufficiently large
to ensure that the market is covered. We identify a consumer with the point in the interval
which represents her ideal variety of a product. A consumer buying a product located at
the distance of x away from her ideal variety will incur utility loss of tx, in addition to the
price of the good, where t is a "transport" cost parameter. Then, we can derive the
demand function for each downstream firm as (see Tirole, 1988, Chapter 7 for details):
(23) qJ (p,, p,) = I + ^p-, i=l,2 and i*j.
Each downstream firm chooses pi to maximize its own profit given the other firm's price pj
and its input price m,.
(24) Max (prmi)(L+£llA)
The first order condition for firm i is given by pj +$ +t -2pr=0, or
(25) p{=^—- , i=l,2 and i*j.
The Nash equilibrium in prices, given input prices of m, and m2, can be derived by solving
Eqs.(25) simultaneously:
(26)
 Pi*(m) = t ^ 2 m ^ m j
The resulting equilibrium quantities are given by
(27) q(nii, mj) - q (pr(m), pj*(m)) - — + — — —
The profits are




Using (27) and (28), we can write:
7 t (c , c ) = T C ( C , C ) = -
,_
 x / A A2
7«C, C)= +
1
 2 3 18/
, _, / A A2
v
 ' 2 3 18/
' -T
4 = , where A = c-c.
- 2 6/
By substituting these values, the condition for the fringe competition to bind
(Assumption 2) is given by a<3/2, where a = —. With the Hotelling-type competition in
the downstream market and the maintained assumption of ct<3/2, it can also be verified
that under a partially integrated structure the integrated firm always chooses the
specialized input for its downstream firm, while under full integration both upstream firms
choose the generalized input for the whole parameter space we consider. In other words,
we have p* < 0 and p** > 1/2, which makes [p_, ~p ] = [0, 1/2]. In addition, the no
counter-merger condition (NCM) is not binding. The only constraints that are binding for
an equilibrium vertical merger are (PI) and (NHO), which can be written as follows for
the case of the Hotelling competition:
(NHO)1 a>l
Taken together, the area of the equilibrium vertical foreclosure is represented by
the shaded (horizontally and vertically) area in Figure 1. Moreover, as will be shown







Figure 1. The Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure
To see the welfare implications of vertical foreclosure in this model, note that
there is no output effect, which makes it relatively easy to compare welfare under vertical
integration and nonintegration. There are two types of costs in this model, production
costs and transportation costs.
Under nonintegration, we know that both downstream firms have the same
marginal cost regardless of the realizations of the upstream costs, and as a result, market
share for each firm is always 1/2. Therefore, the total transportation cost is given by
Also, we know that inputs will be produced at the high cost of c only when both upstream
firms have cost realizations of c . In all other cases, inputs will be supplied by the low
cost firm and the production cost of inputs will be c. Therefore, the expected production
cost under nonintegration is
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The total cost under nonintegration is
• Treuuport
4 4 4
= [t + 3_c + c + p A ] / 4 , w h e r e A = c-_c.
Under a vertical merger by Ul and Dl , the transportation and production costs
with each cost realization can be summarized by Table 1. For instance, consider the case
where cost realization is given by ( c, c). Dl and D2's marginal costs in this case are
given by c and c, respectively, because Ul cannot undercut U2's price due to Ul ' s input
specification tailored for Dl . Thus, Dl ' s market share is given by Si =— + — .
2 6/
/ A2
Therefore, the transportation cost in this case is £ txdx + (T'lixdx=— + . Production
* * 4 36/
1 1 A2
costs are given by Sic + (l-Si)c = — c H—c . Transportation and production costs
2 2 6/







































Table 1. Transportation and Production Costs under Partial Integration
By taking the probability-weighted average, we have
r" - ! + £-
L.Trwuport ^ f
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8 8 ~ 24 /
/ 1 <5 A2
rPi = rPi . rPi _ £ , £ - .£ ^
LTherefore, a vertical merger by Ul and Dl is welfare-reducing if CrL/> CKL/ • The
condition for this is given by p < , where a = —.
2 9 /
2. Cournot Competition with Linear Demand (P = a - Cft in the Final Product Market
When the downstream firms compete in quantities, it turns out that
countermerging is profitable and vertical foreclosure does not arise as in O-S-S. The
intuition for this result is similar to the one provided in O-S-S. With Hotelling
competition, firms' choices are strategic complements; thus, an increase in D2's costs due
to foreclosure has a positive strategic effect in that it invites less aggressive behavior from
its rival firm (Dl). This effect mitigates the incentive for firm 2 to countermerge. In
contrast, when the downstream firm competes in quantities, firms' choices constitute
strategic substitutes. As a result, an increase in D2's costs has a negative strategic effect
of inducing its rival firm to behave more aggressively, in addition to the direct effect of
the higher input costs. Thus, countermerging is profitable with Cournot competition.
However, a slight modification of the basic model can replicate welfare-reducing
vertical foreclosure as an equilibrium outcome. As in Hart and Tirole (1990), let us
introduce a fixed cost of integration, F. We can consider F as internal governance costs
and/or legal costs associated with vertical integration (see the discussion in Hart and
Tirole, 1990). Then, we can find a range of fixed costs for which the initial integration is
profitable but a countermerger is not. The reason is that the magnitude of the profit
increase can be bigger for the initial integration than for the countermerger. To see this,
from Eqs. (18) and (22), we have
4[G" - GCM] = (1 + p)[Kfe c ) + n(c, c) - 2*fe c)] + p [ 2^ ++]
In the Cournot oligopoly (see the Appendix),
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4 [ G v i . QCM] = A [(3A -2P) + 7pp ] , where 0 = a - c a n d A = c - c .
Therefore, the gains from the initial merger (GV:1) is larger than gains from the
countermerger (GCM) if p > [2P - 3A]/7p. If this inequality holds, we can find F such that
QVJ >p> QCM .
 t n e initial merger is profitable but the countermerger is not.
The condition above is more likely to be satisfied as the cost correlation parameter
(p) or the cost differential (A) increases. The reason for this comparative statics result can
be explained in the following way. Let n j , ^ be the combined profits of Ui and Di with
the vertical structure of k, where k = NI, PI, and FI. Then, GVJ = n{J,.D1 - n $ . D 1 and &"
=nu2D2 "nu2D2 • B o t n Ul -Dl and U2-D2 have the same level of combined profits under
NI and FI due to the symmetric vertical structure. Hence, we have GVI > GCM if n P I >
[ n M + n n ]/2, where ITk = n * , . ^ + n j ^ . m is industry profit under vertical structure k;
industry profit under PI is higher than the average industry profits under NI and FI. Note
that as p increases, industry profits under both NI and FI decrease but stay unchanged
under PI, which makes GVI > GCM more likely. In addition, under Cournot oligopoly, the
loss in industry profits from increased cost correlation is given by [n(c, c) + n(c, _c)] -
[ftfe £) + w(c , c )] = 4 AV9, thus is proportional to A2.
It can be also verified that introducing a fixed cost of integration can deter a
countermerger without causing hold-out problems in Cournot oligopoly. With the fixed
cost of vertical merger, the equilibrium bidding price for Ul is given by b = IIjJ.D1 - 11^ -
F. For U l not to have the incentive to hold-out, it is required that b > IlJ^, i.e., 11"^, -
nl^.,^ > F. Also note that Ilu,.D, > nJJ.^, that is, a countermerger reduces the profits
of the initially merged firm, which implies that n^.o, - I I ^ > GCM = n ^ . D 2 - 1 1 ^ .
Therefore, we can always find a range of F which prevents countermerging without
causing the hold-out problem (nJJ.DI - n j ^ > F > G0*4).
Furthermore, with Cournot oligopoly, we can show that both consumer surplus
and social welfare are unambiguously reduced with a vertical merger. Consumer surplus
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1 2
is given by — Q2, where Q is the total industry output. Under NI, Q = — (p + A) when
2
both upstream firms have the cost realization of c while Q = — (3 in all other cases. Under
NI, therefore, consumer welfare is given by:
C S [ ( p )] ( ) [ ^ ]
4 2 3 4 2 3
Under PI, D2's marginal cost is always c . Hence, Q = q(c, c ) + q(c , c) = — when
2
Ul hascwhileQ = — PwhenUl has c .
2 2 3 J 2 2 l 3 H J
Thus, consumers are worse-off with vertical merger since
[CS"1 - CS"] = — [A + p(2A + 4p)] > 0.
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Let us define social welfare as the sum of industry profits and consumer welfare:
W = CSk. With a fixed cost of integration F, it can be verified that
[WNI - W1] = — [(3P - 4A) - 4p(P - A)] - F
36
Recall that for an equilibrium vertical merger to occur F> GFM = — [(2P + 4A) - p(3p +
36
A)]. Hence,
- W"] > — [(5 - 7p)P + 3pA) > 0 since we assume p^l/2.
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IV. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we analyzed a model of vertical foreclosure in which the choice of
input specificity is endogenously derived. In the model, vertical foreclosure occurs as the
upstream division of the integrated firm makes a specialized input for its sister
downstream division. The choice of a specialized input serves as a natural commitment
mechanism for the integrated firm not to supply the rival downstream firms because the
input is less useful to other downstream firms. Thus, our consideration of different
34
specifications of inputs enabled us to dispense with the controversial price commitment
assumption in O-S-S.
For vertical integration to generate an anti-competitive foreclosure in our model, it
is required that the upstream division of the integrated firm has incentives to provide a
specialized input though it would provide the generalized input as an independent firm.
The changes in incentives regarding the choice of input specification can be explained by
the externalities that the choice of a specialized input entails; vertical integration allows the
upstream firm to internalize the benefit to its sister downstream division of raising her rival
firm's costs. We also considered the possibility of a counter-merger by the foreclosed
downstream firm and the potential hold-out problem by the target upstream firm in the
acquisition process. These considerations yielded a coherent model of vertical integration
in which conditions for an anti-competitive vertical foreclosure are explicitly derived. In
addition, we demonstrated the possibility of an anti-competitive vertical foreclosure with
closed-form solutions for a particular oligopoly model of spatial competition.
We conclude by discussing possible extensions of the model. In this paper, we
focused on the case of a symmetric equilibrium in input specifications in the absence of
vertical mergers by limiting our attention to the case of p <l/2. When p >l/2, we can
have asymmetric equilibria in which one firm chooses a specialized input while the other
chooses a generalized input. In this case, it would be interesting to see how this initial
asymmetry affects the incentives to vertically integrate.
One way to interpret our model is to consider the low cost event as an innovation.
Then, the choice of input specification is equivalent to a decision of R&D resource
allocation between projects with fixed R&D resources. One promising avenue of future
research is to endogenize the R&D incentives and to see how vertical integration affects
R&D incentives and how this effect influences the vertical integration decision.19
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The Non-emptiness of the Set £:
1. The Case of Cournot Competition with Linear Demand Curve P= a - O






 x a-2c + c ,_ . \a-2c + c\q(c,c)= -—=, TC(C,C)=I -—=1
f ~"\2
/ _ a-2c + c _x a-2c + c|qfe c ) = , TC(C, c ) = l j=—I
^ = ^ £ A
3 _
^ = = A, where A = c - c
By substituting these expressions into Eq. (17) in the text, we have
T~ L^ (£> *v ~ v^£> €)] a — 7 A
^ + [;r(c,c)-;r(c,c)] 5a-5A
Therefore, p* <l/5 and is decreasing in A. Furthermore, p* < 0 if A > a/7.
2. The Case of Hotelling Competition
In this case, we have
n(c,c)= n(
,_ , / A A2
n(c, c)= + —
K
 ' 2 3 18/
_x / A A2
}





» * = ^ -
As in the Cournot case, p*<l/5 and decreases as A increases. Furthermore, p* decreases
as t decreases, and p* ^ 0 if A/t £ 3/4.
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